Federalist No. 10 (James Madison) – Factions and the danger of majority rule This is arguably the most famous one. Madison argues that a large republic can control the “mischiefs of faction” better than smaller ones. You can tie it to modern political polarization, interest groups, or even social media echo chambers. Federalist No.10 is a product of deep historical reflection, proposing a revolutionary constitutional framework that channels the inevitability of factionalism into a force that preserves liberty and stability. When we think about our world and society as a whole, we think about various people from different backgrounds and cultures. Cultures are broken down into many other aspects and principles, and each one has its
own categorical set of rules and standards. What may seem confusing is clarity because we often think that our notions and ideologies that we are brought up with are somehow in the “majority rule,” but that’s simply not the case; it depends upon how we are brought up and raised, and how
we view moralistic standards of society differently.
Let’s first start by introducing the universal problem of human nature and faction. Throughout all human societies and modern history, self-interest has always existed; whether that be based upon some type of predisposition or personal gain, it exists and still does within our society. Humans naturally group based on shared interests (religion, wealth, power, social class,
etc). This is where factions come into play because they are inevitable in the sense that human nature itself is ambitious, competitive, and sometimes greedy. While an argument can be made these these characteristics play a key role in our society, they do have pivotal advantages and disadvantages. Aristotle, for example, has said that humans are political animals, but he warned that divisions within our society would arise without virtue. Correlating that to Plato in the Republic, he criticized democracy for its vulnerability to factions and mob rule. There is the formulation in his context that democracy is a danger due to excessive freedom, and this encapsulates those with their own self-interest being able to attain power easily. Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan has also said that humans are naturally self-serving, and they need strong structures to prevent collapse. One would argue that even ancient philosophers recognized that division (excluding
unity) is the natural state of mankind. This can give context to polarization within our ideologies and belief systems.
I want to take a brief look at Athens in the 5th century BC. Athens created the first real democracy, but during the Peloponnesian War, which pitted Athens against Sparta, internal factions turned the Athenians against each other. This is where we saw Demagogues use factions to weaken the city-state, and the result was that Athens collapsed and was conquered by Sparta.
This display indicates to us that manipulation for self-power and personal gain does not solidify the founding principles on which an establishment is built. To juxtapose, the Roman Republic in the 1st century BC was originally a balanced republic with a mixture of democracy and aristocracy. Factional violence between certain political groups like the Optimates and Poulares ultimately led to civil wars, and what did this do? It resulted in the collapse of the Republic and the rise of dictatorship under Caesar and the emperors. The Gracchi Brothers in Rome tried to reform land policies to help the poor, but the factions led to political violence and assassinations. We have seen some of this in our modern-day society with the assassination of President Abraham Lincoln, the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, and the attempted assassination of President Donald Trump. This notion births an inner cynicism within people that not only stirs up controversy but also unleashes hatred in the face of frustration. It is essentially where people take
matters into their own hands as a way of moving the hand of justice self self-serving instead of allowing the arc to make that determination. Political violence had a place in society before, but it has no place and brings about no solutions within our society today, and that’s a good thing.
The American Revolution wasn’t just about defeating Britain, but it was about building something stable afterwards. James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and many others studied ancient history deeply. James Madison knew Greek and Latin, and he also read Aristotle, Polybius, and Cicero. We can see indications of this when we look back at his textualism as well as where he drew references from when compiling the Federalist Papers. Madison, Hamilton, and many others knew that declaring liberty wasn’t enough due to its fragility in societies beforehand. They had to design a system that would survive inevitable factional struggles; it’s not a perfect system, but its linearity and uniformity have stood the test of time. If we look back to under the first U.S. government system, the Articles of Confederation, factionism was already hurting the states because there were disputes between big and small states, North and South, etc.
This is one of the reasons why Federalist No. 10 was Revolutionary because Madison flipped the traditional logic. Instead of trying to eliminate factions, he set out to design a system that lets them exist without letting any one of them dominate. The argument he made was that a large, diverse republic would cool down the dangers of faction. Essentially, the bigger and more
diverse the republic, the harder it would be for a majority faction to form. There would be a balance within groups (economic, religious, regional), and representatives would refine public views into wiser decisions compared to direct democracy, where the mob rule might dominate.
The Federalist Papers were fundamentally about conserving the new American experiment by creating structures that protect liberty through order and balance, versus having majoritarian rule.
Madison, Hamilton, and Jay wrote them to argue for a stable constitutional republic, not a pure democracy, as some have confused it with me. These papers reflect an inherent conservative vision in which one seeks to preserve liberty through strong institutions, ordered government, and
a cautious view of human nature. Rather than trusting in the fleeting passions of the majority, the Framers of this document designed a system in which there is a constituional structure that would temper human excesses. People are self-interested, and Madison knew this, which is why
he, I, and many others deem this as normal. We must echo the idea that human nature doesn’t change and systems have to account for it. The insights into Federalist No. 10 are simply
grounded in understanding that human ambition and factionalism are an enduring feature of society and not defects be eradicated. The idea of utopian visions of politics, instead of crafting a
system where the inevitability of faction becomes a safeguard for freedom, must be entirely rejected. It is why we have the separation of powers, checks and balances, and federalism, which are all carefully designed architectures of foundational principles meant to slow down rash decisions. It’s the belief that process matters more than quick outcomes. Liberty ought not to be preserved through radical movements but by the enduring institutions that prevent a concentration of power. The government must be limited, checked, and balanced to safeguard individual freedom.
Useful Information for Readers
– The court recognized in Marbury v. Madison that the enduring strength of constitutional governance solely lies in the ability to restrain power even against the will of majorities
(5 U.S. at 137-180)
– In McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice Marshall affirmed that there is a constitutional framework that must grant limited but supreme powers to national institutions that would prevent factional state interests from undermining national unity (17 U.S. at 316-436).
– In Gibbons v. Ogden, the court emphasized that constitutional structures are necessary to protect economic liberty against a monopolistic faction that might or can potentially arise at the state level (22 U.S. at 1-70).
– In United States v. Lopez, the court also reaffirmed that there are constitutional limits on government power that will serve as crucial safeguards against the erosion of individual
liberty with well-intended intentions in place but overreaching majorities (514 U.S. at 549-602).
– In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the court underscored the importance of preserving constitutional tradition and the structural stability once imposed, even while evolving societal pressures (505 U.S. at 833-979).
– In Citizens United v. FEC, the court embraced James Madison’s vision that there ought to be protection to political speech even with controversies present. It concluded that it is essential in maintaining a competitive free republic (558 U.S. at 310-471).
– In Shelby County v. Holder, the court recognized that enduring constitutional structures are the true bulwarks against what would be deemed as factional abuses as conditions evolve. This rejected the disposition of static laws (570 U.S. at 529-593).
